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.
Revoking the Driving Privileges of High School 
Drop-Outs 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Out of growing concern. for the num.ber of high school 
drop-outs, several states have enacted license revocation 
legíslation. 1 ln general, a license revocation statute requires 
the suspension or revocation of the driver's license of any 
student who drops out of high school without good cause. 2 
Means v. Sidiropolis3 gave the Supreme Court of West 
Virgínia the opportunity to hear one of the flrst challenges 
to a license revocation statute. ln that case, Gregory Allen 
Means, seventeen, dropped-out of high school in order to 
support his pregnant wife.4 Pursuant to West Virgínia's re-
vocation statute, Means' driver's license was revoked.6 Al-
though the West Virgínia statute provided an exception for 
a student who had withdrawn due to "circumstances beyond 
[the student's] control,..s Means apparently did not fall into 
this exception. The court, with two justices dissenting, sus-
tained the statute's overall constitutionality but reversed 
that part of the lower court's opinion which held that the 
1. States which have enacted license revocation laws include: Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Tennessee and West Virgínia. The legislatures of several other states 
are currently considering similar legislation. 
2. Although not included in the present discussion, West Virginia's license 
revocation statute also prohibits the issuance of a driver's license to students who 
are not making satisfactory progress in school. See W. VA. CODE § 18-8-ll(aX1) 
(1988). 
3. 401 S.E.2d 447 rN. Va. 1990). 
4. By the time the appeal was heard by the West Virgínia Supreme Court, 
Gregory Means had reached the age of eighteen, thus outside of the statute's 
reach. Id. at 449. 
5. The W est Virgínia provision reads: 
Whenever a student sixteen years of age or older withdraws from 
school . . . the attendance director or chief administrator shall notify the 
department of motor vehicles of such withdrawal. Within five days of 
receipt of such notice, the department . . . shall send notice to the licens-
ee that the license will be suspended . . . unless documentation [of enroll· 
ment] . . . is received by the department. 
W. VA. ConE § 18-8-ll(b) (1988). 
6. Id. § 18-8-ll(d). 
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statute did not viola te procedural due process. 7 
The Means decision furnishes an interpretive template 
with which this article will examine the constitutional issues 
raised when a student's driver's license is revoked for drop-
ping-out of school. ln addition, the author will suggest a 
means by which state legislators may draft effective, con-
stitutional license revocation statutes. 
II. DUE PROCESS 
The opm10n in Means began by acknowledging that the 
revocation of a driver's license "implicates due process con-
siderations. "8 lndeed, regardless of whether a state denomi-
nates a driver's license as a "privilege" or "right," it is nev-
ertheless a protected "entitlement interest" for due process 
purposes.9 
Recognizing that the suspension of a driver's license 
implicates due process is but part of the analysis; the axi-
omatic question remains: What process is due to protect 
against unconstitutional government regulation? ln cases not 
involving suspect classifications or fundamental rights issues, 
procedural due process requires that a court consider the 
following factors: 
[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation 
of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute proce-
dural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and adminis-
trative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.10 
The United States Supreme Court, in Dixon v. Love, 11 
cited these three "Eldridge factors" when it upheld an Illi-
nois statute authorizing the revocation of driver's licenses 
7. Means, 401 S.E.2d at 450. 
8. Id. (citing Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979)). 
9. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); accord Bell v. Burson, 402 
U.S. 535, 539 (1970) (whether considered a privilege or a right, license revocation 
legislation must comport with due process); see also LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-9, at 686 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter, TRIBE]. 
10. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
11. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1976) (per curiam). 
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without a prior hearing.12 Under the statute, the Illinois 
Secretary of State was given discretionary authority to re-
voke or suspend the license of any driver who fell into one 
of eighteen categorias. ln applying the Eldridge test, the 
Court held that since the statute contained special provi-
sions for hardship and that the "risk of an erroneous depri-
vation in the absence of a prior hearing [was] not great," 
there was no reason to depart from the "established doc-
trine" of allowing "less than an evidentiary hearing . . . 
prior to an adverse administra tive action. "13 
lf the Dixon case demonstrates the manner in which 
the Eldridge test is applied, how may the case be reconciled 
with the Court's earlier holding in Bell v. Burson?14 ln 
Bell, the Court invalidated, on due process grounds, a Geor-
gia statute which mandatorily suspended the driver's license 
of motorists who were involved in injury accidents. The 
statute mandated the revocation if the affected motorist was 
unable to post a bond for the amount of potential damages 
incurred by injured parties. The statute in Bell provided for 
an administrativa hearing, but of a statutorily limited scope. 
Significantly, the issue of potential liability could not be 
decided at the hearing. 15 
The Supreme Court held that because liability was an 
inseparable part of the state's statutory scheme, the in-
ability of the administrativa hearing to consider the question 
of liability amounted to a denial of due process. ln the 
Court's opinion, due process required two things of the ad-
ministrativa hearing. First, the hearing must adjudicate the 
issue of liability prior to revoking a motorist's license. Sec-
ond, the hearing is required to be one which would be both 
"meaningful" and "appropriate to the nature of the case."16 
As it was, the administrativa hearing provided for by the 
Georgia legislatura was neither meaningful, in that it could 
not consider the core issue of liability, nor appropriate to 
the nature of the case, for precisely the sarne reason. 
The Court in Dixon "fully" distinguished Bell on the 
12. ILL. REV. STAT. eh. 95112, § 6·206(a) (1975). 
13. Di:ron, 431 U.S. at 113 (citing Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343). 
14. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1970). 
15. See id. at 538. 
16. Id. at 542 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 
306, 313 (1950)). 
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ground that the statute in Dixon was directed toward an 
"important public interest in safety on the roads and high-
ways, and in prompt remova! of a safety hazard."17 By con-
trast, the statute invalidated in Bell was presumably direct-
ed toward ensuring that parties injured by negligent drivers 
would be compensated. 
Th.e following rule can be extracted from the Bell and 
Dixon decisions: Where a license is to be revoked pursuant 
to a statutory scheme, the focus of which (whether explicit 
or implicit) is on the existence of a particular factor, the 
licensee must be afforded a hearing, prior to revocation, 
which has the power to decide that issue. The only excep-
tion to this rule arises when a public safety interest is 
involved. 
The West Virginia statute which carne before the court 
in Means could not possibly pass muster under this rule. 
Gregory Means was not provided a hearing to determine 
whether his withdrawal from school was for reasons "beyond 
his control. "18 Moreover, a reduction of the number of high 
school drop-outs, not any public safety interest, was the 
primary motivation behind the statute. However, this appar-
ent failure of due process does not require the conclusion 
that legislation of a similar nature is doomed; there are 
often more ways than one to sustain an act. 
III. AVOIDING THE DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS 
ln Means, the majority tried to hedge its conclusion 
that a state may revoke or suspend student driver's licenses 
for a legitimate legislative end (albeit one wholly unrelated 
to public safety). The court intimated that the due process 
analysis might not even be necessary.19 Whereas the major-
ity conceded that issued licenses are protectable 
entitlements, nothing in the decision suggests that the ma-
jority considered probationary licenses to be of the sarne 
genre. 
The court's opinion began: "[l]t is important to point out 
that persons between the ages of sixteen and eighteen are 
not entitled to regular, unconditional driver's licenses. Rath-
17. Dixon, 431 U.S. at 114. 
18. See W. VA. CODE § 18-8-ll(d). 
19. See Mea118, 401 S.E.2d at 452. 
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er, under [the statute] a person under the age of eighteen 
is entitled only to a 'junior' or 'probationary' driver's li-
cense. "20 Indeed, this view appears consistent with the bulk 
of traditional thought. 21 Whether a protectable entitlement 
exists depends upon the wording and construction of the 
particular statute which creates the benefit and upon the 
"pertinent understanding between government and individ-
uais. "22 Thus when a statute bestows a benefit which cre-
ates the reasonable expectation that such benefit will contin-
ue, an "entitlement" is said to be created. Conversely, when 
a benefit is bestowed under clearly understood terms or 
under conditions which avoid the creation of an expectancy, 
no property interest is formed. 23 ln context, when a driver 
receives his or her license with a clear understanding that 
such license is only probationary or conditional, the state 
may regulate or restrict its use without fully comporting 
with traditional due process requirements.24 The United 
20. Id. 
21. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). ln Roth, the terms of 
employment between a state university and a professor were such that the univer· 
sity retained the right not to renew the professor's contract without giving a 
reason for its decision. The Court held that the professor had no protectable 
property interest since the contract could not have engendered an expectation that 
it would be renewed or that the university's exercise of its option not to renew 
would be based on good cause. See id. at 578; see also NOWAK, ET AL., CONSTI· 
TUTIONAL LAW 547 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter NOWAK]. But at least one commenta· 
tor has already criticized the Mea118 opinion, maintaining that the majority in 
Mea118 fostered a "profound misconception conceming the nature of licenses and 
benefits ... . w Charles A. Reich, The Individual Sector, 100 YALE L.J. 1408 (1991). 
Nevertheless, the majority in Mea118 did not go so far as to say that revoking 
the privilege of a probationary license does not require due process. 
22. TRIBE, supra note 9. 
23. Nowak put it thus: 
The Court will recognize interests in govemment benefits as constitution· 
al[ly protectable] "property" where a person can be deemed to be "enti-
tled" to them. Thus, the applicable federal, state or local law which gov-
erns the dispensation of the benefit must defme the interest in such a 
way that the individual should continue to [expect to] receive it under the 
terms of the law. 
See NOWAK, supra note 21 at 547. Are there any limita to this? Nowak himself 
suggested: 
[l]f a town refused to accept a particular child into its primary education-
al system, even though the child appeared to qualify under applicable 
law, it is difficult to believe that the concept of . . . entitlement would 
eliminate the requirement of a fair procedure to determine the basis for 
this action. 
Id. But cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975) {entitlement to education 
implicates due process). 
24. However, this is not true in the case of entitlements which create a depen· 
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States Supreme Court has only required clarity in under-
standing as touching the terms or conditions placed upon 
state-created benefits.25 
At a minimum, to avoid a procedural due process chal-
lenge to their license revocation legislation, states should 
make it clear at issuance that the license is both probation-
ary and conditional, and emphasize that the condition 
placed upon the license is the student's continued enroll-
ment in school. 26 
IV. PRoBLEMS WITH THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
Unfortunately, the Due Process Clause is not the only 
constitutional hoop through which a legislativa act must 
jump. Statutes of this type are often ripe with equal pro-
tection issues. When a statute burdens a specific class of 
individuais "courts must reach and determine the question 
whether the classifications drawn in [the] statute are rea-
sonable in light of its purpose. "27 Reasonableness, in tum, 
depends on whether or not the class burdened by the stat-
ute is one "rationally related to furthering a legitimate state 
interest. "28 
License revocation statutes affect only a particular class 
of individuais: student drivers under the age of eighteen. 
Regardless of educational background, drivers over eighteen 
are not burdened under these laws. Assuming that proba-
tionary driver's licenses are protectable property interests, 
would it violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to burden current student drivers, but 
leave untouched those drivers who dropped-out decades 
earlier? 
dent relationship with the govemment regarding basic needs. ln such circumstanc· 
es, an opportunity to be heard must be afforded. See TRIBE supra at note 9, 686; 
see also United States Dep't of Agric. v. Murrey, 413 U.S. 508 (1973). 
25. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). It remains to be seen, 
however, whether one can argue that a sixteen-year-old who receives a 
license-even a probationary license-fully understands that the license may be 
revoked for reasons wholly unrelated to public safety. 
26. ln those few states which have license revocation statutes, most require 
proof of enrollment before issuance of the flrst license. This undoubtedly goes a 
long way towards instilling upon young drivers the conditional nature of the 
license. E.g., W. VA. ConE § 18-8-ll(a) (1988). 
27. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). 
28. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (per 
curiam) (italics added). 
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Equal protection's "rationality standard" requires only 
that states have a legitimate interest in creating a particu-
lar classification. Historically, the courts have given great 
deference to most state legislative classifications. Discussing 
the rationality standard, the Means majority cited McGowan 
v. Maryland. 29 The Supreme Court in McGowan held that 
the rationality standard only requires that a legislative 
classification be founded on a set of facts which "reasonably 
may be conceived to justify it. "80 ln the case of license re-
vocation statutes, the obvious interest served by the law is 
a reduction in the number of high school drop-outs. Whether 
such st.atutes are effective in attaining this goal can be 
questioned, but few would argue that the goal itself is 
illegitimate. It also goes without saying that such a statute 
must necessarily burden high school students. Because of 
the degree of judicial deference afforded legislative classifica-
tions in cases like McGowan and DeCastro, 31 it is not sur-
prising that West Virginia's statute, reviewed in Means, 
experienced no difficulty under the Equal Protection Clause. 
V. THE VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE AND STATUTORY 
EXCEPriONS 
The Constitution requires that a statute provide a "suf-
ficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when 
measured by common understanding and practices. "32 Ad-
mittedly, this measure of vagueness is itself somewhat 
vague. To make matters worse, courts have often used the 
vagueness doctrine to curb legislation for reasons other than 
fair notice.33 With license revocation statutes, the question 
29. Means, 401 S.E.2d at 451 n.2. The court in Means considered McGowan's 
hoiding germane to both its equal protection and substantive due process inquiries. 
See generally McGowan v. Maryiand, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
30. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 426. 
31. ln Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976), the Court heid that, for 
a classification to fali to an equal protection challenge, there is a required showing 
that the classification is "cleariy wrong, [or] a dispiay of arbitrary power .... • 
See al8o Raiiway Express v. New York 336 U.S. 106 (1949). "It is no requirement 
of equal protection that ali evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at ali. • 
Id. at 110. 
32. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1951), quoted in GERALD 
GUNTHER, CONSTITUI'IONAL LAW 1156-57 n.20 (11th ed. 1985) [hereinafter 
GUNTHER]. 
33. GUNTHER, supra note 32, at 1157 n.20 (quoting Note, "The Void-For-Vague-
ness Doctrine in the Supreme Court," 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960)). 
32 BYU JOURNAL OF LA W AND EDUCATION [1992 
of vagueness turns on the degree of specificity found in the 
language of the statutory exceptions. The Means dissent, 
lead by Justice McHugh, attacked the inexplicit language in 
West Virginia's statutory exceptions, contending: "lt is the 
general principie of statutory law that a statute must be 
definite to be valid. "84 
Notwithstanding McHugh's fervor, his bald statement 
did little to clarify what the standard should be. McHugh 
did say, however, that the vagueness of a statute depends 
upon the type of statute involved.86 Accordingly, he noted 
that under the conventional rule, the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine should be more forgiving when applied to economic 
regulation as opposed to those statutes which impose crimi-
nal penalties. Justice McHugh concluded: "Certainly then, 
the statute at issue in this case . . . would be subject to 
more scrutiny under the vagueness doctrine than a statute 
involving economic matters .... "36 
McHugh's principal complaint was directed toward the 
statute's "beyond [the student's] control" exception.37 The 
West Virginia legislatura left the availability of the excep-
tion to the exclusive, unreviewable discretion of school offi-
cials. ln H ague v. CIO, 38 the Supreme Court confronted a 
similar vagueness issue, albeit in a more traditional sense. 
ln Hague, the Court invalidated, on vagueness grounds, a 
city ordinance which gave wide discretion to city authorities 
in issuing permits for public assembly. The Court held that 
such discretionary authority would provide city officials the 
wherewithal to use "mere opinion" as "an instrument of 
arbitrary suppression. "39 This conclusion was aided, in part, 
by the fact that the city ordinance in Hague was obviously 
One commentator has expressed dissatisfaction with the void-for-vagueness doc-
trine, and called for its demise: "[T]he Court should determine the case on its 
merits in relation to established constitutional guarantees, rather than evade 
constitutional issues on the ground of vagueness." Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology 
and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication: A Survey and Criteria, in SELECTED 
ESSAYS ON CONSTI11JTIONAL LAW 522, 595 n.272 (1963) (quoting Note, Void For 
Vagueness: An Escape From Statutory Interpretation, 23 Ind. L. J. 272, 285 (1948)). 
34. Mea118, 401 S.E.2d at 455 (McHugh, J. dissenting) (citing 16A AM. JUR. 2D 
Co118titutional Law § 818 (1979)). 
35. See id. at 455-56 (citing Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Whelling Wholesale 
Grocery Co., 328 S.E.2d 144 (W. Va. 1984)). 
36. Id. at 456. 
37. See id. 
38. 307 u.s. 496 (1939). 
39. Id. at 516. 
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being used by city officials as an instrument to prevent the 
circulation of pro-union pamphlets. 
It is not im.plausible that a license revocation statute, 
which places discretion solely in the hands of school offi-
cials, could be subjected to similar discriminatory applica-
tion. Such unreviewable discretion ought not be given to 
school officials to determine ·whether a student has dropped-
out of school "due to circumstances beyond his or her con-
trol," or "for good cause. J040 
A few examples by way of illustration are in order. 
Imagine a case in which a student, sixteen, quits school to 
work in order to pay for his girlfriend's abortion. Will the 
School Superintendent's discretion be affected by her person-
al views on abortion? Suppose instead, a seventeen-year-old 
drops out to marry his pregnant girlfriend but needs full-
tim.e employment to support her and the child? (The Means 
case) Perhaps an equally difficult question arises when a 
student drops out to pursue a career such as acting, or to 
join the professional tennis circuit. Does the potential for a 
six-figure income constitute "good cause?" Should such a 
student (who, despite an initially rosy outlook, may end up 
completely impecunious) be favored over one who quits 
school to go fishing? 
ln court, statutes which place discretionary exemptions 
solely in the hands of school of:ficials will not stand up as 
well as those which employ exceptions in the form of a 
"laundry list." Nor will such legislation be congenial to judi-
cial scrutiny when the only court involvement is tied to a 
constitutional challenge. When addressing the problem of 
vagueness, the legislatures in each state must weigh the 
benefits and burdens of these two alternativas. 
A. Return to Entitlement Analysis 
Perhaps Justice McHugh was unjusti:fied in implying 
that West Virginia's revocation statute imposes a punitive 
sanction, 41 thereby requiring a more rigorous vagueness 
analysis. McHugh's argument for a higher standard neces-
sarily hinges on the notion that a probationary driver's 
40. E.g., W. VA. ConE § 18-8-ll(d) (1988) (exception to statute phrased as "cir· 
cumstances beyond student's control"); see also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32:431 (West 
Supp. 1991) (standard for exemption listed as "acceptable circumstances"). 
41. See Means, 401 S.E.2d at 455 (McHugh, J. dissenting). 
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license is a protectable entitlement. Indeed, an anomaly 
would certainly exist if West Virginia's "criminal" statute 
penalized an individual by taking away a right which did 
not exist or by confiscating property which the defendant 
did not own. ln other words, is McHugh wasting ink by at-
tacking as unconstitutionally vague a statute which infringes 
on a mere revokable privilege? Were the majority in Means 
given a second chance to counter Justice McHugh's asser-
tion, it might well emphasize that West Virginia's statute 
imposes no penalty, but simply sets forth the conditions 
that accompany the issuance of every probationary license. 
Again, this argument depends upon the "understanding" that 
existed between the Department of Motor Vehicles and the 
student licensee at the time of issuance. Where conditions 
imposed on a probationary driver's license are deemed per-
functory or "vague" so as to give a student licensee the 
justified expectation that the license is irrevocable, the stat-
ute will likely encounter obstacles in its enforcement. 
VI. DRAFriNG THE PERFECT STATUTE 
There is no "perfect" statute and license revocation 
statutes are no exception. States that wish to enact such 
laws must always balance the risks involved. Defending a 
statute in court is never cheap. Moreover, those jurisdictions 
which have poor urban areas may not see a lot of benefit, 
since fewer students living in crowded, inner-city wards 
have access to an automobile. Revoking the driver's license 
of a youth who customarily walks or rides the subway will 
not have a significant effect. On the other hand, in those 
cases in which a statute proves effective, the results will 
likely be dramatic. 
From the preceding discussion, certain guidelines may 
comfortably be set. First, the importance of avoiding the 
creation of an entitlement interest cannot be underestimat-
ed. Conditions affecting probationary licenses need to be 
made clear from first issuance. Second, notice should be 
given prior to revocation. 42 Third, an opportunity to appeal 
42. The Tennessee revocation statute, TENN. CODE. ANN. § 49-6-3017 (1988), 
requires that notice be sent prior to the suspension of the license. ln Louisiana, 
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32:431 (West Supp. 1991) also provides for notice to be sent 
prior to the actual cancellation of the student's driver's license, but explicitly states 
that "[t]he cancellation shall be imposed without hearing." See id., § 32:431B(2). 
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or assert an exemption should be had before officials who 
are empowered to adjudicate all of the operativa elements 
and exceptions listed in the statute. Finally, exceptions and 
exemptions should be phrased in language which does not 
create a doubt as to whom they will benefit. As stated ear-
lier, such exceptions should be laundry-listed to avoid confu-
sion. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Innovative legislation always brings mixed results. Be-
cause there is no fool-proof guide through the judicial land-
scape, legislatures often resort to using a degree of "ouija" 
analysis in drafting law. Nevertheless, by adhering to the 
guidelines diagrammed above, states should have a better 
chance of drafting legislation which will both withstand 
constitutional challenge and assist educators in improving 
the graduation rate of high school students. 
Andrew J. Bolton 
